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Learning on the Job: Glatt v. Fox Searchlight 
Pictures, Inc.’s Primary Beneficiary Test and Its 
Implications for Harassment and Discrimination 
Protections for Unpaid Interns under Title IX 
Irene Hickey Sullivan† 
ABSTRACT 
Despite the prevalence of internships in today’s economy, the law is unsettled as to 
whether unpaid interns are entitled to harassment and discrimination protections 
under federal law. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bars harassment and 
discrimination from the workplace, but only towards employees. The circuit courts 
are divided as to what test to apply in determining whether unpaid interns qualify 
as employees and fall within the scope of Title VII. This Comment argues that the 
primary beneficiary test the Second Circuit adopted in Glatt v. Fox Searchlight 
Pictures, Inc. best addresses this question by evaluating whether an internship is 
primarily educational. An unpaid intern has not yet succeeded in bringing a Title 
VII challenge; however, this Comment argues that the primary beneficiary analy-
sis could support an avenue for recovery under Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments Act of 1972. This Comment demonstrates that if the primary purpose of an 
internship is educational, then the internship should qualify as an “education pro-
gram or activity” under Title IX, and therefore protections against gender-based 
harassment and discrimination come into effect. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
While studying social work at Marymount College in Tarrytown, 
New York, Bridget O’Connor began working at an unpaid internship at 
Rockland, a state-operated hospital for the mentally disabled, as re-
quired by her major in social work.1 Ms. O’Connor typically worked at 
Rockland on Mondays and Wednesdays from approximately 8:00am to 
4:30pm, as these times did not conflict with her class schedule. While 
 
 † B.A. 2013, Amherst College; J.D. Candidate 2018, The University of Chicago Law School. I 
would like to thank Professor Emily Buss, Michael Pollack, Róisín Duffy-Gideon, and Andrew Ho-
sea for their invaluable guidance and insights. 
 1 O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 113 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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at Rockland, Ms. O’Connor met with patients and documented the re-
sults of these meetings in “process recordings,” which she then gave to 
her supervisor.2 Ms. O’Connor worked with Dr. James Davis, a licensed 
psychiatrist at Rockland.3 Over the course of the internship, Dr. Davis 
displayed highly inappropriate behavior toward Ms. O’Connor. Dr. Da-
vis continually referred to Ms. O’Connor as “Miss Sexual Harassment,” 
which he later explained was a compliment, intending to communicate 
that Ms. O’Connor “was physically attractive and, as such, was likely to 
be the object of sexual harassment.”4 He frequently made inappropriate 
sexual remarks towards her. For example, one morning, Dr. Davis 
pointed out to Ms. O’Connor that “she and her boyfriend must have had 
‘a good time’ the night before.”5 In another instance, he referenced a 
newspaper photograph of a woman in only her underwear, and an-
nounced that the woman was Ms. O’Connor.6 He once requested to Ms. 
O’Connor and other women in the room that they should take part in 
an “orgy.”7 He also once told Ms. O’Connor to take off her clothes before 
meeting with him, saying, “Don’t you always take your clothes off before 
you go into the doctor’s office?”8 When Ms. O’Connor complained about 
Dr. Davis’s inappropriate remarks to another supervisor, she was told 
it was best to just ignore him.9 Within four months, Ms. O’Connor left 
Rockland due to the hostile working conditions, and Marymount placed 
her at another location to complete her internship requirement.10 
Unpaid internships, such as the one Bridget O’Connor participated 
in at Rockland, have become increasingly common in the workplace.11 
Many college students, as well as recent graduates, participate in in-
ternships at some point during their undergraduate tenure. In 2014, 
nearly 64% of graduating seniors reported to the National Association 
of Colleges and Employers (NACE) that they participated in some form 
 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. at 113–14. 
 6 Id. at 114. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. at 113. 
 10 Id. at 114. 
 11 Hannah Nicholes, Comment, Making the Case for Interns: How the Federal Courts’ Refusal 
to Protect Interns Means the Failure of Title VII, 15 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 80, 
92 (2015). 
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of internship while earning their bachelor’s degree.12 More than 20 in-
dustries, from legal to finance to consulting, host internships today.13 
Of these internships, around 40% are unpaid.14 
Employers’ and students’ perceptions of the benefits that come 
from internships largely explain the rise of these programs in recent 
years. First, employers use interns to staff positions that were once full-
time, particularly since the economic recession of the 2000s.15 Interns 
thus increasingly provide companies with much more substantive work 
than the stereotypical errand-boy serving coffee.16 Second, companies 
expend significant resources while recruiting, selecting, and training 
new interns and seek a return on this investment through the creation 
of a pool of potential applicants for full-time employment in years to 
come.17 Beyond forming a prospective applicant pool, internships also 
provide employers with an extended period of time to evaluate a future 
job candidate in her actual work environment and verify that she per-
forms high-quality work.18 
Students also see value in internships and now consider them to be 
critical to their career preparation. College career centers advise stu-
dents that internships provide opportunities to explore career options 
while allowing them “to gain exposure to potential careers, to develop 
professional work skills, and to obtain a competitive advantage in the 
job search.”19 Schools also may provide students with academic credit 
for their internships or, as in Ms. O’Connor’s case, even require intern-
ships for graduation from particular programs. Furthermore, students 
perceive internships not only as a boost, but as an increasingly neces-
sary credential in a competitive job market. Between 2000 and 2010, 
the annual number of graduates receiving bachelor’s degrees increased 
 
 12 NAT’L ASS’N OF COLLS. & EMP’RS, THE CLASS OF 2014 STUDENT SURVEY (2014), http://career. 
sa.ucsb.edu/files/docs/handouts/2014-student-survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/PC26-BW2H]. 
 13 Nicholes, supra note 11, at 92–93. 
 14 Michael Pardoe, Comment, Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc.: Moving Towards a More 
Flexible Approach to the Classification of Unpaid Interns Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 75 
U. MD. L. REV. 1159 (2016) (citing NAT’L ASS’N OF COLLS AND EMP’RS, THE CLASS OF 2015 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 (2015), https://www.naceweb.org/uploadedfiles/content/static-assets/down 
loads/executive-summary/2015-student-survey-executive-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/VX3X-6 
NH6]). 
 15 Beth Braccio Hering, Why are Internships so Important?, CNN (Apr. 13, 2010, 11:09 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/LIVING/worklife/04/14/cb.why.internships.important/ [https://perma.cc 
/6W59-KMEV]. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Nicholes, supra note 11, at 94. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Internships and Externships, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO CAREER ADVANCEMENT (Jan. 1, 
2017, 12:00 PM), https://careeradvancement.uchicago.edu/jobs-internships-research/internships-
externships [https://perma.cc/6SXG-JJZW]. 
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by 30%, from 1.2 to 1.6 million,20 far outpacing the country’s 9.7% pop-
ulation growth in that same time period.21 College students who partic-
ipate in internships are more likely to obtain full-time job offers after 
graduation and to receive a higher level of compensation than their 
peers who do not take advantage of such opportunities.22 NACE found 
that, in 2014, 52.1% of students who had internship experience received 
full-time job offers, compared to 38.6% of those who did not have an 
internship. Internships often provide direct paths to later employment; 
employers reported to NACE that 55% of interns later become employ-
ees.23 
Although unpaid internships are a common feature of student ed-
ucational experiences, the law is unclear as to whether these unpaid 
interns are entitled to federal protection24 from gender-based harass-
ment and discrimination. Although other forms of discrimination and 
harassment, such as race, religion, and sexual orientation,25 are cer-
tainly worthy of attention, this Comment focuses specifically on sexual 
harassment and gender-based discrimination. Currently, the nearly 
two-thirds of graduating students who participate in unpaid intern-
ships over the course of their college careers work without federal pro-
tection from gender-based harassment and discrimination at their in-
ternship sites.26 The lack of protection afforded to unpaid interns could 
have implications for the gender composition of certain occupations. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196427 provides employees with 
protection from harassment and discrimination in the workplace.28 To 
date, only one district court has held that an unpaid intern qualified as 
 
 20 Brian Burnsed, Degrees are Great, but Internships Make a Difference, U.S. NEWS 
EDUCATION (Apr. 15, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/education/articles/2010/04/15/ 
when-a-degree-isnt-enough [https://perma.cc/S7R7-8MEC]. 
 21 PAUL MACKUN & STEVEN WILSON, POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND CHANGE: 2000 TO 2010 
(Mar. 2011), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/36VH-
8J55]. 
 22 NAT’L ASS’N OF COLLS. & EMP’RS, supra note 12, at 39. 
 23 Id. at 42. 
 24 Some states have passed statutes protecting unpaid interns from harassment and discrim-
ination. See, e.g., Sexual Harassment Protections for Unpaid Interns, TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. 
§ 21.1065 (2015). State law protections are outside the scope of this Comment. 
 25 The Seventh Circuit has held that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form 
of sex discrimination under Title VII. See Hively v. Ivy Tech College of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339 (7th 
Cir. 2017). The Supreme Court, however, has not yet addressed this question. Id. at 340. It is 
furthermore unclear whether Title IX applies to gay, lesbian, and transgender students. See, e.g., 
Adele P. Kimmel, Title IX: An Imperfect but Vital Tool to Stop Bulling of LGBT Students, 125 YALE 
L. J. 2006 (2016). Given the uncertainty surrounding the application of Title VII and Title IX to 
issues of sexual orientation, this Comment excludes these issues from its discussion. 
 26 NAT’L ASS’N OF COLLS. & EMP’RS, supra note 12. 
 27 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012). 
 28 Nicholes, supra note 11, at 83. 
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an employee, and that decision was later vacated by the Second Cir-
cuit.29 Without employee status, unpaid interns are not covered under 
Title VII and therefore cannot invoke federal protections against har-
assment and discrimination in their workplaces.30 When courts deter-
mine that unpaid interns are not employees, companies can discrimi-
nate against them in their hiring processes without fear of 
repercussions under Title VII, even though these interns comprise a 
substantial portion of the future hiring pool.31 In addition, if an em-
ployer discriminates against or harasses an intern during the course of 
the internship, Title VII also does not provide a form of recourse for the 
intern, even when the ill-treatment causes the intern to terminate her 
relationship with the internship program.32 
Circuit courts are currently split regarding what test courts should 
use to determine whether an unpaid intern is an employee and thus 
receives harassment and discrimination protection under Title VII. The 
Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits use a primary beneficiary 
test,33 the Tenth Circuit utilizes a totality of the circumstances test,34 
and the Eleventh Circuit purports to use an economic realities test,35 
although more recently it has also used a primary beneficiary test.36 
This Comment will advocate that the primary beneficiary test the Se-
cond Circuit recently adopted in Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc.37 
is superior among these tests. 
Following this discussion of the primary beneficiary test, the Com-
ment will then turn to Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 
 
 29 Jamey Collidge, Comment, “I Mean, You’re Not Staff”: The Employee Classification Circuit 
Split and Why the Southern District of New York’s Totality of the Circumstances Test from Glatt v. 
Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. Deserves a Lead Role, 60 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 53, 69–70 (2015) 
(noting that Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), marked the 
first time a district court had held an intern was an employee. This decision was ultimately vacated 
by the Second Circuit in Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528 (2015)). 
 30 Cynthia Grant Bowman & MaryBeth Lipp, Legal Limbo of the Student Intern: The Respon-
sibility of Colleges and Universities to Protect Student Interns Against Sexual Harassment, 23 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 95, 96 (2000). An unpaid intern can also use state tort law to bring an action 
for sexual harassment. See Joanna Stromberg, Comment, Sexual Harassment: Discrimination or 
Tort?, 12 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 317 (2003). This approach, however, is outside the scope of this 
Comment. 
 31 Bowman, supra note 30, at 96. 
 32 See O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 33 See Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 532 (2d Cir. 2015); McLaughlin v. 
Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1210 (4th Cir. 1989); Donovan v. American Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 272 
(5th Cir. 1982); Solis v. Laurelbrook & Sch., Inc., 642 F3d. 518, 520 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 34 See Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1027 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 35 See Kaplan v. Code Billing & Coding, Inc., 504 F. App’x 831, 834 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 36 See Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., 803 F.3d 1199, 1213 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 37 Glatt, 811 F.3d at 536. 
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1972 and the protection it affords against sexual harassment and gen-
der-based discrimination in educational settings.38 This Comment ar-
gues that when courts find interns to have a high degree of educational 
benefit and thus deny Title VII protections under the primary benefi-
ciary test, Title IX protections kick in, as the internship will qualify as 
an “education program or activity” under Title IX if the internship site 
receives federal funding in any capacity. Furthermore, if a university 
sponsors or facilitates an internship at an off-site location that does not 
receive federal funding, this Comment will argue that this internship 
also warrants coverage under Title IX, with the sponsoring educational 
institution facing potential liability. 
II. TITLE VII, TITLE IX, AND PROTECTIONS FROM HARASSMENT 
AND DISCRIMINATION 
A. The Purpose of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Title VII regulates the relationship between employees and em-
ployers in both the private and public sectors.39 Title VII makes it illegal 
for employers to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because 
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”40 The 
language of Title VII demonstrates that Congress intended “to assure 
equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discrimi-
natory practices and devices which have fostered . . . job environments 
to the disadvantage of minority citizens.”41 In passing such legislation, 
Congress did not aim to guarantee a job to every person but to remove 
“artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers of employment when the 
barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or 
other impermissible classification.”42 
The Supreme Court extended the reach of Title VII beyond discrim-
ination that has an economic or other obvious impact to “the creation or 
perpetuation of a discriminatory work environment.”43 Therefore, sex-
 
 38 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”). 
 39 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
 40 Id. 
 41 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971)). 
 42 Id. at 800–01. 
 43 Nicholes, supra note 11, at 84 (quoting Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2440 
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ual harassment that is “so ‘severe or pervasive’ as to ‘alter the condi-
tions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working envi-
ronment [sic]’” creates an actionable harm under Title VII.44 When em-
ployers “knowingly or negligently allow a work environment to become 
‘heavily charged’ with discrimination,” they may be held liable under 
Title VII.45 When originally enacted, recovery under Title VII was lim-
ited to equitable relief in the forms of reinstatement, back pay, and or-
ders to cease the discriminatory practice(s).46 The 1991 amendments to 
Title VII allow plaintiffs to also seek compensatory and punitive dam-
ages.47 Compensatory damages are allowed for pecuniary and nonpecu-
niary losses and are capped between $50,000 and $300,000, depending 
on the size of the offending institution.48 
B. The Legal Definition of Employee 
Courts have interpreted Title VII protections to apply only to “em-
ployees.”49 Title VII circularly defines the term “employee” as “an indi-
vidual employed by an employer.”50 As a result, how courts determine 
which workers qualify as employees is critical for determining whether 
Title VII protections apply. The Supreme Court has not yet directly ad-
dressed the question of whether unpaid interns qualify as employees.51 
However, in Walling v. Portland Terminal Co.,52 the Court held that 
unpaid trainees learning how to operate railcars were not employees, 
and were therefore not covered under the minimum wage provision of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).53 The Court articulated several 
reasons for its conclusion. First, the trainees did not “displace any of 
the regular employees,” their work did “not expedite the company busi-
ness,” and sometimes their work would “actually impede and retard 
it.”54 Second, trainees did not necessarily expect to receive employment 
after the completion of their training.55 There was also no evidence that 
“trainees ever expected to receive . . . any remuneration for the training 
 
(2013)). 
 44 Id. (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998)). 
 45 Id. (quoting Rogers v. E.E.O.C., 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)). 
 46 Stromberg, supra note 30, at 325. 
 47 42 U.S.C. § 1981a-(a)(1). 
 48 42 U.S.C. § 1981a-(b)(3). 
 49 Nicholes, supra note 11, at 82. 
 50 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2012). 
 51 See, e.g., Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 536 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 52 330 U.S. 148 (1947). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 149–50. 
 55 Id. at 150. 
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period other than the contingent allowance.”56 Ultimately, the Court 
concluded that the “railroads receive no ‘immediate advantage’ from 
any work done by the trainees.”57 In conducting its analysis, the Court 
did not imply that any particular fact relevant to Portland Terminal 
was determinative for inquiries in other employment contexts.58 
Drawing heavily on the court’s reasoning in Portland Terminal, the 
Department of Labor (DOL) issued Fact Sheet #71 in 2010 to provide 
guidance for unpaid interns in the for-profit sector.59 The DOL guide-
lines state that: 
an employment relationship does not exist if all of the following 
factors apply: 
1.! The internship, even though it includes actual operation 
of the facilities of the employer, is similar to training 
which would be given in an educational environment; 
2.! The internship experience is for the benefit of the intern; 
3.! The intern does not displace regular employees, but 
works under close supervision of existing staff; 
4.! The employer that provides the training derives no im-
mediate advantage from the activities of the intern; and 
on occasion its operations may actually be impeded; 
5.! The intern is not necessarily entitled to a job at the con-
clusion of the internship; and 
6.! The employer and the intern understand that the intern 
is not entitled to wages for the time spent in the intern-
ship.60 
Although this set of factors may be a helpful guideline in some cases, 
the Second Circuit concluded in Glatt that Fact Sheet #71 is not legally 
dispositive.61 
 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 153. 
 58 See id. at 150–53. See also Glatt v. Fox Searchlight, 811 F.3d 528, 537 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Noth-
ing in the Supreme Court’s decision suggests that any particular fact was essential to its conclu-
sion or that the facts on which it relied would have the same relevance in every workplace.”). 
 59 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., FACT SHEET #71: INTERNSHIP PROGRAMS UNDER 
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (Apr. 2010), http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs 
71.htm [https://perma.cc/6NL7-X6ZJ] (emphasis added). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Glatt, 811 F.3d at 536 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (The weight 
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C. The Unpaid Intern FLSA Circuit Split and the Glatt Primary 
Beneficiary Test 
To date, no appellate court has upheld a decision to award em-
ployee status to an intern.62 Despite the uniformity in this result, circuit 
courts are divided regarding what test to apply when determining 
whether a worker is an employee. The FLSA, which sets out various 
employment relations (including minimum wages and requirements on 
overtime pay),63 and Title VII define “employee” in the same circular 
language: “an individual employed by an employer.”64 The Supreme 
Court has instructed lower courts to interpret the term in these and 
other statutes using the common law of agency.65 Therefore, lower 
courts use similar analyses in evaluating whether a worker is an em-
ployee under each statute.66 The cases in this section interpret the 
meaning of “employee” in the context of the FLSA, but the same reason-
ing should be applicable to Title VII. 
In the FLSA context, courts generally utilize one of three different 
tests: (1) a totality of the circumstances test, (2) an economic realities 
test, or (3) a “‘primary purpose” or “primary beneficiary” test.67 The to-
tality of the circumstances test looks to the factors in Fact Sheet #71 to 
determine whether someone is an unpaid intern, considering which 
party each factor favors and then balancing the factors against one an-
other.68 It typically differs from the Fact Sheet #71 in that the DOL 
requires satisfaction of all the factors in its fact sheet, whereas a court 
applying the totality of the circumstances test instead weighs the fac-
tors against one another.69 
 
given to the Administrator’s judgment depends on “all those factors which give it power to per-
suade.”)). 
 62 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 63 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., HANDY REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE FAIR LABOR 
STANDARDS ACT (Sept. 2016), https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/hrg.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
5TSE-7UFR]. 
 64 29 U.S.C. §203(e) (2002). See also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 
(1992) (describing the same definition under ERISA as “completely circular and explain[ing] noth-
ing”). 
 65 Ware v. United States, 67 F.3d 574, 576 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Darden, 503 U.S. at 322–24). 
 66 See David C. Yamada, The Employment Law Rights of Student Interns, 35 CONN. L. REV. 
215, 239–40 (2002). For further discussion of the nuances distinguishing the various tests that 
lower courts use to determine employee status under Title VII and FLSA and an argument that 
courts should use the same test in both contexts, see Elizabeth Heffernan, Comment, It Will Be 
Good For You, They Said: Ensuring Internships Actually Benefit the Intern and Why It Matters for 
FLSA and Title VII Claims, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1757 (2017). 
 67 Collidge, supra note 29, at 54. 
 68 Id. at 68. 
 69 Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1026 (10th Cir. 1993). 
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The economic realities test looks to the “extent to which the puta-
tive employee is dependent, as a matter of economic reality, on the ser-
vices that he or she is rendering to the putative employer.”70 When ex-
ercising the economic realities test, courts consider factors such as “the 
degree of the alleged employer’s right to control the manner in which 
the work is to be performed” and “the alleged employee’s opportunity 
for profit or loss depending on his managerial skill.”71 Courts frequently 
use the economic realities test in the context of distinguishing employ-
ees from independent contractors. In 2013, the Eleventh Circuit pur-
ported to apply this test to cover the question of unpaid interns in 
Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc,72 but the court’s analysis 
merely mimicked the primary beneficiary test.73 Like the court in Glatt, 
the court in Kaplan focused on educational aspects of the internship, 
and noted that the plaintiffs “did in fact engage in hands-on work for 
their formal degree program” and “received academic credit for their 
work.”74 The court further stated, “Plaintiffs caused Defendants’ busi-
nesses to run less efficiently and cause duplication of effort.”75 This 
analysis mirrors the factor from Glatt that interns’ work “complements, 
rather than displaces, the work of paid employees.”76 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s decision Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A.77 reinforces this 
analysis; in this case, the Eleventh Circuit addressed unpaid intern-
ships by citing Glatt with no mention of Kaplan.78 
Last, the Second Circuit recently adopted a primary beneficiary 
test. In Glatt, the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York originally concluded that the plaintiffs, unpaid interns 
working on the film Black Swan, were employees. It reasoned that the 
first four DOL factors weighed in their favor.79 The Second Circuit, how-
ever, vacated the decision of the District Court,80 and adopted a primary 
beneficiary test. It stated that “an employment relationship is not cre-
ated when the tangible and intangible benefits provided to the intern 
 
 70 Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 71 Elizabeth R. Langton, Comment, Workplace Discrimination as a Public Health Issue: The 
Necessity of Title VII Protections for Volunteers, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1455, 1475–76 (2015) (quoting 
Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs. Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979)). 
 72 504 F. App’x 831 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 73 See id. at 834–35. 
 74 Id. at 834. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 537 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 77 803 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 78 Id. at 1210. 
 79 Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 80 Glatt, 811 F.3d at 538. 
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are greater than the intern’s contribution to the employer’s operation.”81 
The Glatt court declined an invitation from the DOL to utilize the six-
prong test from Fact Sheet #71, because it “attempts to fit Portland Ter-
minal’s particular factors to all workplaces and because the test is too 
rigid for our precedent to withstand.”82 
In adopting the primary beneficiary test, the Second Circuit artic-
ulated “a set of non-exhaustive factors to aid courts in determining 
whether a worker is an employee for purposes of the FLSA.”83 These 
factors include: 
1.! The extent to which the intern and the employer clearly 
understand there is no expectation of compensation. Any 
promise of compensation, express or implied, suggests 
that the intern is an employee—and vice versa. 
2.! The extent to which the internship provides training that 
would be similar to that which would be given in an edu-
cational environment, including the clinical and other 
hands-on training provided by educational institutions. 
3.! The extent to which the internship is tied to the interns’ 
formal education program by integrated coursework or 
the receipt of academic credit. 
4.! The extent to which the internship accommodates the in-
tern’s academic commitments by corresponding to the ac-
ademic calendar. 
5.! The extent to which the internship’s duration is limited 
to the period in which the internship provides the intern 
with beneficial learning. 
6.! The extent to which the intern’s work complements, ra-
ther than displaces, the work of paid employees while 
providing significant educational benefits to the intern. 
7.! The extent to which the intern and the employer under-
stand that the internship is conducted without entitle-
ment to a paid job at the conclusion of the internship.84 
 
 81 Id. at 535. 
 82 Id. at 536. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
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The Glatt court explained in its conclusion: “The approach we adopt 
also reflects a central feature of the modern internship—the relation-
ship between the internship and the intern’s formal education.”85 Alt-
hough there is some overlap between the two tests, the court focused on 
the educational aspects of the internship to better reflect “the role of 
the internships in today’s economy than the DOL factors.”86 The court 
reasoned that the purpose of an internship is to “integrate classroom 
learning with practical skill development in a real-world setting.”87 
D. The Purpose of Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 
In addition to the relief that Title VII affords, Title IX88 provides 
protections for harassment and discrimination specifically for incidents 
concerning gender in educational settings.89 In relevant part, Title IX 
reads, “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be ex-
cluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected 
to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance.”90 “Title IX has been construed to prohibit 
gender discrimination against students and employees alike in educa-
tional institutions that receive federal funding.”91 The critical question 
for liability under Title IX thus becomes whether an internship program 
can qualify as an “education program or activity.” 
Although early interpretations of Title IX assumed that it only ap-
plied to the particular division or program within a university receiving 
federal funds, in 1988, Congress amended Title IX to define “program 
or activity”:92 
(1)(i) A department, agency, special purpose district, or other in-
strumentality of a State or of a local government; or 
(ii) The entity of such a State or local government that distrib-
utes Federal financial assistance and each such department or 
agency . . . to which the assistance [to a State or local govern-
ment] is extended . . .; 
 
 85 Id. at 537. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2012). 
 89 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). 
 90 Id. 
 91 O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 113 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Murray v. New York Univ. Col-
lege of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 234, 248 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 92 Bowman, supra note 30, at 112. 
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(2)(i) A college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or 
a public system of higher education; or 
(ii) A local educational agency . . . , system of vocational educa-
tion, or other school system; 
(3)(i) An entire corporation, partnership or other private organi-
zation, or an entire sole proprietorship— 
(A) If assistance is extended to such corporation, partnership, 
private organization, or sole proprietorship as a whole; or 
(B) Which is principally engaged in the business of providing ed-
ucation, health care, housing, social services, or parks and rec-
reation.93 
Since this amendment was added, “courts have consistently inter-
preted Title IX to mean that if one arm of a university or state agency 
receives federal funds, the entire institution is subject to Title IX’s pro-
scription against sex discrimination.”94 In the event of an allegation of 
discrimination, the Supreme Court has held that, in addition to the fed-
eral government withholding funding, individuals have a private right 
of action to sue on their own behalf and damages are available as a 
remedy.95 In addition, the Supreme Court has concluded that Title IX 
prohibits sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination.96 
E. Courts Have Not Settled Whether an Internship at a Host 
Institution Receiving Federal Funding Qualifies as an “Education 
Program or Activity” 
Only one circuit has addressed a harassment or discrimination 
claim for an unpaid intern under Title IX and thus whether an unpaid 
internship can qualify as an education program or activity. In O’Connor 
v. Davis,97 the facts of which were described at the beginning of this 
Comment, Bridget O’Connor sued Rockland, a state-run hospital for the 
mentally disabled where she was completing a social work internship.98 
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss 
 
 93 45 CFR § 86.2(h). 
 94 O’Connor, 126 F.3d at 117 (citing Horner v. Kentucky High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 43 F.3d 265, 
271 (6th Cir. 1994); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 894 (1st Cir. 1993)). 
 95 Bowman, supra note 30, at 112 (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); 
Franklin v. Gwinnet County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992)). 
 96 Id. (citing Alexander v. Yale, 631 F.2d 178 (2d. Cir. 1980); Franklin, 503 U.S. 60). 
 97 126 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 98 Id. at 113. 
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O’Connor’s Title IX claim.99 O’Connor argued that Rockland was an ed-
ucation program because it “both receives federal financial assistance 
either through the state, its patients, or its employees, and also oper-
ates ‘vocational training through an organized educational program.’”100 
The Second Circuit rejected this argument, concluding that Rockland 
was not an “education program or activity” as defined in Title IX.101 The 
court reasoned that, when clarifying the phrase “program or activity,” 
Congress elected to leave “education” unchanged. Thus, the court ar-
gued that Congress intended for an entity falling under the domain of 
Title IX to “have features such that one could reasonably consider its 
mission to be, at least in part, educational.”102 
O’Connor argued that Rockland provided her with vocational train-
ing, and thus could “be considered to operate an organized educational 
program.”103 The Second Circuit, however, disagreed, looking to the def-
inition of “institution of vocational education”: “a school or institution 
which has as its primary purpose preparation of students to pursue a 
technical, skilled, or semiskilled occupation or trade . . . , whether or not 
the school or institution offers certificates, diplomas, or degrees and 
whether or not it offers fulltime study.”104 The Second Circuit concluded 
that Rockland does not provide education as its “primary purpose,” 
since “it accepts no tuition, has no teachers, has no evaluation process, 
and requires no regular hours or course of study for its volunteer work-
ers.”105 
Conversely, some courts have concluded that educational or voca-
tional programs at state correctional facilities receiving federal funding 
qualify as “education programs or activities” under Title IX. For exam-
ple, in Jeldness v. Pearce,106 the Ninth Circuit noted that Title IX ex-
empts “religious schools, military and merchant marine schools, frater-
nities, sororities, voluntary youth organizations, beauty programs,” and 
others, but does not provide an exemption for correctional institutions, 
although Congress has amended the statute several times.107 “When a 
statute lists specific exemptions, other exemptions are not to be judi-
cially implied.”108 
 
 99 Id. at 116. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 117. 
 103 Id. at 118. 
 104 Id. (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(o)) (emphasis added). 
 105 Id. 
 106 30 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 107 Id. at 1225. 
 108 Id. (citing Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616–17 (1980)). 
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The Jeldness court also noted that the regulations were not meant 
to apply solely to “traditional educational institutions.”109 The court 
looked to the codified purpose of the regulations: “Title IX . . . is de-
signed to eliminate (with certain exceptions) discrimination on the basis 
of sex in any education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance, whether or not such program or activity is offered or spon-
sored by an educational program or institution.”110 Lastly, the court 
stated that Title 45 C.F.R. § 86.11 applies “to every recipient and to 
each education program or activity operated by such recipient which 
receives or benefits from federal financial assistance.”111 The regula-
tions define “recipient” as: 
any State or political subdivision, . . . any public or private 
agency, institution, or organization, or other entity, or any per-
son, to whom Federal financial assistance is extended directly or 
through another recipient and which operates an education pro-
gram or activity which receives or benefits from such assis-
tance.112 
This definition does not explicitly limit the scope of Title IX to tradi-
tional educational institutions, such as colleges and universities. In the 
context of unpaid internships, however, the O’Connor court determined 
that Rockland was not comparable to an educational or vocational pro-
gram at a state correctional facility, noting that “such programs typi-
cally provide instructors, evaluations, and offer a particular course of 
training.”113 
F. Courts Have Not Settled Whether Title IX Applies to 
School-Sponsored Internships that Do Not Receive Federal 
Funding 
There is an open question as to whether internships are covered 
under Title IX when they are sponsored by a university or other educa-
tional institution but are hosted by organizations that are not consid-
ered “recipients” under Title IX. For example, in Crandell v. New York 
College of Osteopathic Medicine (NYCOM),114 the District Court for the 
 
 109 Jeldness, 30 F.3d at 1226. 
 110 Id. (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 86.1 (emphasis added by court)). 
 111 Id. (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 86.11). 
 112 Id. (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 86.2 (h)). 
 113 O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Jeldness, 30 F.3d 1220; Women 
Prisoners of the Dist. of Columbia Dep’t of Corrections v. District of Columbia, 899 F.Supp. 659, 
668–69 (D.D.C. 1995)). 
 114 87 F. Supp. 2d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
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Southern District of New York held that a clinical internship program 
required for graduation was subject to Title IX even if the internship 
was not hosted by a federally funded hospital.115 The court noted, “Title 
IX applies to harassment occurring in programs not operated by the re-
cipient if student participation in such programs is required by the re-
cipient, which is exactly the case here.”116 In this case, medical students 
were required to take part in clinical rotations as part of their curricu-
lum. School administrators assigned students to these programs, de-
signed and managed their operation, and selected hospital personnel as 
supervisors.117 These supervisors were required to receive adjunct fac-
ulty status at the school and undergo a regular review process, although 
the school could not directly hire or fire them.118 
In addition, language from the Department of Education Office of 
Civil Rights guidelines suggests that Congress intended internships di-
rectly affiliated with colleges and universities to fall within the scope of 
Title IX. The guidelines regarding education programs and activities 
refer to “any academic, extracurricular, research, and occupation train-
ing, or other education program or activity operated by a recipient 
which receives federal financial assistance.”119 The guidelines also pro-
vide that programs not wholly operated by recipients qualify if the re-
cipient “requires participation” by any student or if the recipient “facil-
itates, permits, or considers such participation as part of or equivalent 
to an education program or activity operated by such recipient.”120 Alt-
hough the language of the guidelines does not necessarily suggest lia-
bility for the institution hosting the internship placement, it does sug-
gest that education programs required or facilitated by a university at 
an off-site location fall under the domain of Title IX. 
The O’Connor court, on the other hand, rejected the argument that 
Rockland operated an education program. Marymount’s status as an 
educational institution, the court reasoned, did not impute education 
program qualities onto Rockland.121 According to the Second Circuit, 
the connection between Marymount and Rockland—that Marymount 
contacted Rockland for the purposes of establishing an internship place-
 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 317. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 34 C.F.R. § 106.31 (a). 
 120 34 C.F.R. § 106.31(d)(1)–(2) (emphasis added). 
 121 O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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ment and that a Rockland employee evaluated O’Connor—was “insuffi-
cient to establish Rockland as an agent or arm of Marymount for Title 
IX purposes.”122 
III. THE PRIMARY BENEFICIARY TEST AS A SOLUTION TO THE FLSA 
AND TITLE VII UNPAID INTERN CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Of the many tests that courts have adopted to determine whether 
a worker is an employee or an intern under the FLSA and Title VII, the 
Second Circuit’s primary beneficiary test is the superior test because it 
is both consistent with Supreme Court precedent and incentivizes in-
ternship programs to provide interns with quality educational experi-
ences. Courts should thus abandon use of the economic reality and to-
tality of circumstances tests in favor of the primary beneficiary test. 
After defending the superiority of the primary beneficiary test over 
other options in the context of Title VII, this Comment will explore the 
implications of the primary beneficiary test for harassment and dis-
crimination claims under Title IX as an alternative avenue for relief. 
A. The Primary Beneficiary Test Is Consistent with Supreme Court 
Precedent 
To begin, Portland Terminal does not provide useful guidance for 
distinguishing between employees and today’s unpaid interns, and total 
deference is thus unwarranted. First, the opinion of Portland Terminal 
is very fact-intensive, possibly indicating that the Court did not intend 
for its holding to apply seamlessly to other scenarios. Second, in listing 
several factors that contributed to its evaluation of whether workers 
were employees, the Court did not specify that any particular factor was 
conclusive in reaching its decision.123 Rather, the Court used the factors 
as a guide to answer its central question: whether the railroad or the 
trainees received a greater benefit from the training program.124 In 
other words, the Court essentially applied a primary beneficiary test. 
Third, the Court decided Portland Terminal in a vastly different 
labor market than today’s, and all of its considerations do not translate 
 
 122 Id. 
 123 See Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150–53 (1947). See also Glatt v. Fox 
Searchlight, 811 F.3d 528, 537 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Nothing in the Supreme Court’s decision suggests 
that any particular fact was essential to its conclusion or that the facts on which it relied would 
have the same relevance in every workplace.”). 
 124 Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 152–53. See also Gregory S. Bergman, Comment, Unpaid 
Internships: A Tale of Legal Dissonance, 11 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 551, 585 (2014) (“The 
Court did use the factors as a guide to its analysis but held that those factors informed the ultimate 
inquiry: which party was the primary beneficiary of the work done by the trainees?” (citing Port-
land Terminal, 330 U.S. at 152–53)). 
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well into the modern workplace. In Portland Terminal, railroad work-
ers received training for a particular job.125 The current internship mar-
ket tends to provide less specific training to perform a particular task, 
and instead more intangible benefits. Although some job training takes 
place, there tends to be a greater focus on “soft skills,” such as “how you 
articulate your ideas, how you interact with bosses and colleagues, 
and . . . how you respond to failure,”126 and on gaining knowledge of an 
industry and career path. 
Similarly, whereas Fact Sheet #71 takes one factor directly from 
Portland Terminal—“the employer that provides the training derives 
no immediate advantage from the activities of the intern”127—the court 
in Glatt rejected this as out of step with the benefits that modern in-
ternships provide interns.128 The Glatt court focused on the instant in-
ternship program’s academic parallels and particular educational ben-
efits.129 The court reasoned that whether there is any modicum of 
immediate advantage “from the internship program will not help to an-
swer whether the internship program could be tied to an education pro-
gram, whether and what type of training the internship program pro-
vided,” and other questions relevant to the benefit the trainee 
receives.130 In Portland Terminal, although the railroad may not have 
received an “immediate advantage,” the company still had strong eco-
nomic incentives to train the workers to have a sufficient labor pool.131 
Today’s internships, on the other hand, are often driven by “students 
seeking the internships[,] as opposed to a particular company’s business 
requirements.”132 The prohibition against any “immediate advantage” 
is therefore inapplicable when there are otherwise educational benefits 
to the intern that outweigh the benefit received by the sponsoring or-
ganization. 
B. The Glatt Primary Beneficiary Test Best Incentivizes 
Improvements of the Educational Quality of Internship Programs 
The primary beneficiary test may be a misnomer for what the Se-
cond Circuit perceives to be really at issue in its analysis of internship 
 
 125 Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 149. 
 126 Why Soft Skills Speak Louder, MONSTER (last visited Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.monster. 
co.uk/career-advice/article/why-soft-skills-speak-louder [https://perma.cc/BF2E-P7CA]. 
 127 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., supra note 59. 
 128 Glatt, 811 F.3d at 539. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., 803 F.3d 1199, 1213 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 132 Id. 
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programs—the magnitude of the educational benefit that unpaid in-
terns receive from their program. The non-exhaustive list of factors the 
Second Circuit provided in Glatt suggests that the court was less con-
cerned with who gains more from the relationship between employer 
and employee and more focused solely on whether or not the internship 
provides an educational benefit to its participants. Therefore, even if an 
employer receives significant benefit from the internship program, the 
Second Circuit appears not to care as long as the intern learns from her 
own experience. 
Regardless of how much educational benefit a student receives 
from an internship, because of the reality of today’s hiring processes, 
students will likely still continue to apply to such programs to build 
their credentials and obtain whatever advantage they can in the post-
graduate labor market. But the primary beneficiary test could incentiv-
ize employers to enhance the educational aspects of their internship 
program in order to avoid wage and hour regulations under the FLSA. 
It is undoubtedly in a student’s best interest that an internship not only 
help her get a future job, but also position her to succeed once she starts 
work. Thus, a primary beneficiary test examining educational benefit 
will largely enhance the internship experience by incentivizing employ-
ers to provide increased training and preparation. Although those in-
centives will likely leave students in internships without harassment 
and discrimination protection under Title VII, there is still a possibility 
for students to seek recourse under Title IX, as discussed later in this 
Comment. 
IV. TITLE IX AS AN ALTERNATE PATH FOR GENDER-BASED 
HARASSMENT AND DISCRIMINATION PROTECTIONS FOR 
UNPAID INTERNS 
The primary beneficiary test will not only ensure better quality in-
ternships, but, more importantly, will allow for another avenue of re-
lief—Title IX. If a court finds that an internship is not primarily educa-
tional, the intern is an employee, and Title VII protections come into 
effect. Yet, in the many circumstances when a court finds that an in-
ternship is primarily educational, although Title VII does not cover the 
situation, the internship could qualify as an “educational program and 
activity” under Title IX. Under this framework, internships in host sites 
that receive federal funding will virtually always133 have an avenue for 
 
 133 The court in Schumann acknowledged that determining the primary beneficiary of an in-
ternship is not always a clear-cut inquiry. Some internships may be neither primarily educational 
nor primarily non-educational. See Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., 803 F.3d 1199, 1214−15 
(11th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e caution that the proper resolution of a case may not necessarily be an all-
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relief for harassment and discrimination: if not through Title VII be-
cause the internship is primarily educational, then through Title IX. 
This Comment argues that when an internship takes place at an 
organization receiving federal funding the internship site can be held 
liable under Title IX regardless of whether this institution is itself a 
school or traditional place of learning. It further argues that when the 
internship takes place at an organization that does not receive federal 
funding, but a college, university, or other educational institution facil-
itates the internship, the facilitating entity can be held liable, along 
with the internship host site in some instances. 
A. Internships at Organizations Receiving Federal Funding Qualify 
as “Education Programs and Activities” under Title IX 
Whether an unpaid intern receives harassment and discrimination 
protection under Title IX hinges on whether the internship qualifies as 
an “education program or activity.” The Second Circuit’s primary bene-
ficiary analysis is useful for determining whether internships meet this 
standard. If a court using the Glatt primary beneficiary test concludes 
that an internship is primarily educational, the intern is not an em-
ployee. But such an internship is more likely to qualify as an education 
program or activity under Title IX. When using the primary beneficiary 
test, the court in Glatt included five factors that focus exclusively on 
educational benefits. These factors demonstrate that if an internship 
primarily benefits the intern, it is because of its educational purpose. If 
an internship program has education as its “primary purpose,” it satis-
fies the definition of “institution of vocational education” under Title IX. 
Under this reading, interns in these programs should therefore benefit 
from Title IX harassment and discrimination protections. 
To rebut this approach, an institution employing unpaid interns 
might argue that, although the primary purpose of the internship pro-
gram might be educational, the institution as a whole does not have 
education as part of its mission, and therefore it is exempt from Title 
IX. The O’Connor court makes this argument: “[W]e think it evident 
that in order to implicate Title IX in the first instance, an entity must 
 
or-nothing determination. That is, we can envision a scenario where a portion of the student’s 
efforts constitute a bona fide internship that primarily benefits the student, but the employer also 
takes unfair advantage of the student’s need to complete the internship by making continuation 
of the internship implicitly or explicitly contingent on the student’s performance of tasks or his 
working of hours well beyond the bounds of what could fairly be expected to be a part of the in-
ternship.”) Using the framework this Comment proposes, it is possible that neither Title VII nor 
Title IX would provide relief for harassment and discrimination protection in these cases, although 
a finding that an internship has at least a partial educational purpose still would inform the Title 
IX analysis. 
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have features such that one could reasonably consider its mission to be, 
at least in part, educational.”134 The legislative history, however, indi-
cates that this distinction was not important to Congress. The Senate 
Report of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 states: 
If a private hospital corporation is extended federal assistance 
for its emergency room, all of the operations of the hospital, in-
cluding for example, the operating rooms, the pediatrics depart-
ment, admissions, discharge office, etc., are covered under Title 
VI, section 504, and the Age Discrimination Act. Since Title IX 
is limited to education programs or activities, it would apply only 
to the students and employees of educational programs of the 
hospital, if any.135 
Even in the case of academic hospitals affiliated with major research 
universities, no one would reasonably argue that education is part of a 
typical hospital’s mission; rather, a hospital primarily serves its pa-
tients. By acknowledging that education programs or activities at a pri-
vate hospital would fall under the domain of Title IX, the Senate makes 
clear its intention that the domain of Title IX extends beyond tradi-
tional high schools, colleges, and universities. Institutions with a pri-
mary focus outside of education should therefore fall under Title IX, as 
long as a vocational program operating within the institution has edu-
cation as its primary purpose. 
Furthermore, a small number of courts have found that Title IX 
applies to institutions outside of schools, colleges, and universities. In 
Sternberg v. U.S.A. National Karate-Do Federation, Inc.,136 for example, 
the Eastern District of New York held that the withdrawing of a 
women’s but not a men’s karate team from international competition is 
a recognizable claim under Title IX because the Karate Federation’s 
mission, by running training programs, is at least in part educa-
tional.137 In Jeldness, as another example, a correctional facility quali-
fied as recipient under Title IX.138 
Prisons, however, may be an inapplicable example to demonstrate 
that Title IX can apply outside of traditional educational institutions. 
Although briefly, the legislative history of Title IX explicitly mentions 
prisons, possibly indicating that Congress intended for jails and prisons 
 
 134 O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 135 S. Rep. No. 100-64, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. at 18–19 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3, 20. 
 136 123 F. Supp. 2d 659 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 137 Id. at 662. 
 138 Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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to qualify under Title IX but did not intend for other institutions outside 
of schools and universities to qualify. The Senate Report for the Civil 
Rights Restoration Act of 1987 noted, “Prolonged debate takes place 
over what constitutes a ‘program of activity’ under the civil rights law, 
while the universities, schools and correctional facilities receive mil-
lions of dollars.”139 
A straightforward analysis of the regulation, however, confirms 
that programs at institutions without education as a focus of their mis-
sions may fall under Title IX. The act states, “[T]his part 86 [pertaining 
to nondiscrimination on the basis of sex in educational programs or ac-
tivities receiving federal financial assistance] applies to every recipient 
and to the education program or activity operated by such recipient 
which receives Federal financial assistance.”140 As stated before, the 
regulation defines “recipient” as: 
any State or political subdivision thereof, . . . any public or pri-
vate agency, institution, or organization, or other entity, or any 
person, to whom Federal financial assistance is extended di-
rectly or through another recipient which operates an education 
program or activity which receives such assistance, including 
any subunit, successor, assignee, or transferee thereof.141 
The regulation does not limit coverage of Title IX to institutions tradi-
tionally considered to have education as their primary purpose, such as 
high schools and colleges. Rather, any “public or private agency, insti-
tution, or organization, or other entity” receiving federal financial as-
sistance and operating an “education program or activity” falls under 
its domain.142 It does not limit its definition to institutions with educa-
tion as part of their mission. 
Furthermore, regarding prisons, one could argue that the very 
term “correctional facility” suggests that a purpose of the institution is 
to rehabilitate, and therefore educate, its occupants, and that correc-
tional facilities fall in the same general category of traditional institu-
tions of education as universities and schools. While Congress has 
deemed providing “the defendant with needed educational or vocation 
training” a valid purpose of incarceration,143 a sentencing court may not 
 
 139 Id. at 1225 (quoting S.Rep. No. 100-65, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1988), reprinted in 1988 
U.S. Code & Admin. News 3, 13)). 
 140 45 CFR § 86.11. 
 141 45 CFR § 86.2(h)(4)(i). 
 142 Id. 
 143 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(d). 
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impose or lengthen a prison term in order to foster a defendant’s reha-
bilitation.144 Education, arguably, cannot be a key part of a prison’s mis-
sion. This follows intuitively, as jails and prisons do not come to mind 
as places of learning in the same way that schools and universities do. 
Lastly, Title IX may provide the only avenue for federal relief from 
harassment and discrimination for unpaid interns working at nonprofit 
organizations and government agencies, which sponsor forty percent of 
unpaid internships.145 The Glatt court limited its holding only to interns 
at for-profit entities.146 Additionally, many scholars have argued that 
unpaid internships at charitable nonprofits fall within the scope of the 
“volunteer exception” to the FLSA, and courts therefore never consider 
interns in these settings to be employees.147 Title IX, on the other hand, 
would cover internships at nonprofit and government agencies if they 
qualify as education programs or activities. 
B. Title IX Should Apply to School-Sponsored Off-Site Internships 
Even If the Hosting Location Does Not Receive Federal Funding 
If an internship site does not receive federal funding, the hosting 
institution cannot be held liable under Title IX. If, however, a school, 
university, or other institution that does qualify as a recipient under 
Title IX sponsors or in some way facilitates an off-site internship, the 
recipient should be held liable under Title IX for any incidents of sexual 
harassment or gender discrimination that occur at the host site. In 
Crandell, the Southern District of New York held that a clinical clerk-
ship, which NYCOM required for graduation from medical school and 
that took place at a non-university run hospital, was subject to Title IX, 
even though the hospital did not receive federal funding.148 The court 
 
 144 United States v. Tapia, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2385 (2011). 
 145 Thomas Johnson, Comment, The Fox Searchlight Signal: Why Fox Searchlight Marks the 
Beginning of the End for Preferential Treatment of Unpaid Internships at Nonprofits, 102 VA. L. 
REV. 1127, 1129 (2016). 
 146 Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. 811 F.3d 528, 536 n.2 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Like the parties 
and amici, we limit our discussion to internships at for-profit employers.”). 
 147 Johnson, supra note 145, at 1143 (citing Susan Harthill, Shining the Spotlight on Unpaid 
Law-Student Workers, 38 VT. L. REV. 555, 600–02 (2014); Maurice S. Pianko, Dealing with the 
Problem of Unpaid Interns and Nonprofit/Profit-Neutral Newsmagazines: A Legal Argument that 
Balances the Rights of America’s Hardworking Interns with the Needs of America’s Hardworking 
News Gatherers, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 36–37 (2014); Emily Bodtke, Note, When Volunteers Be-
come Employees: Using a Threshold-Remuneration Test Informed by the Fair Labor Standards Act 
to Distinguish Employees from Volunteers, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1113, 1122–23, 1123 n.71 (2015)). For 
a more thorough discussion of the volunteer exception of the FLSA, including the DOL’s interpre-
tation and counterarguments to these commentators, see Johnson, supra note 145, at 1143–51. 
 148 Crandell v. New York College of Osteopathic Medicine (NYCOM), 87 F. Supp. 2d 304 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
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looked to the language of Title IX, which states that its regulations ap-
ply to “programs not wholly operated by the recipient [of federal funds] 
if the recipient ‘requires participation’ by any student therein or the 
recipient ‘facilitates, permits, or considers such participation as part of 
or equivalent to any education program or activity operated by such re-
cipient.’”149 Because NYCOM required clinical rotations for graduation, 
the court reasoned that the clinical rotations clearly fit within the stat-
ute. Other university-required or university-facilitated internships, 
such as those that are not mandatory but where a student participates 
in the internship for academic credit, should therefore be subject to Ti-
tle IX. 
On the other hand, in Crandell, there is a closer affiliation between 
the school and hosting hospitals than in many-off site internships. Re-
call that NYCOM required supervisors to receive adjunct faculty status 
and undergo reviews by a committee of faculty members, and that 
NYCOM faculty designed and managed the program.150 Some may ar-
gue that the strong relationship between the school and hospital distin-
guishes this case from other off-site internships that maintain a much 
less structured relationship between the sponsoring university and in-
ternship placement site. This, however, is not necessarily the case if one 
looks to the spirit of the court’s reasoning and the text of Title IX. First, 
the district court concluded that Title IX applies when a plaintiff alleged 
“a nexus between the off campus misconduct and a hostile environment 
at the institution.”151 This reasoning should apply to other cases where 
incidents of harassment and discrimination cause a student to fear re-
percussions at her home educational institution, such as failing a course 
or failing to obtain a recommendation, even in the absence of a strong 
relationship between the sponsoring and hosting institutions. Second, 
there is some ambiguity in what it means for a recipient to “facilitate, 
permit, or consider[ ] such participation as part of or equivalent to an 
education program or activity operated by such recipient.”152 If a uni-
versity provides academic credit for an internship, even if the intern-
ship is not mandatory for graduation, the program should qualify, since 
the university must consider it the equivalent of an education program 
or activity by offering academic credit. Furthermore, if a university 
plays a role in helping the student locate the internship, possibly 
through the career services office, even if not for academic credit, it 
 
 149 Id. at 317. 
 150 Id. at 312. 
 151 Id. at 316. 
 152 Id. at 317. 
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should arguably also qualify as “facilitating” or “permitting” the intern-
ship.153 
In these cases, the school would be liable for incidents of harass-
ment and discrimination occurring at the internship site. In some in-
stances, however, the status as an education program may be imputed 
from a school to a non-federally funded host site. O’Connor explicitly 
states this was not the case in the situation before the court, but sug-
gested that some factors could have led the court to a different conclu-
sion: “institutional affiliation,” a written agreement binding the two en-
tities, shared staff, funds circulating between the two institutions, and 
repeated student interns.154 
V. CONCLUSION 
Currently, the nearly two-thirds of students who participate in un-
paid internships at some point in college work without federal protec-
tion from harassment and discrimination.155 Companies, nonprofit or-
ganizations, and government agencies can discriminate in hiring 
interns and during the course of the internship, and such employers can 
both perpetuate and condone hostile work environments for interns 
without fear of legal repercussions under Title VII. Because internships 
function as a significant pipeline to employment in many industries, the 
lack of protections for unpaid interns not only harms the individual in-
tern by denying legal recourse, but also harms efforts to promote the 
broader advancement of gender equality in the workplace. 
For interns to warrant protection from harassment and discrimi-
nation under Title VII, the interns must qualify as employees. Of the 
tests that appellate courts utilize to assess whether an unpaid intern 
qualifies as an employee, the primary beneficiary test that the Second 
Circuit promulgates in Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. best ad-
dresses the question because it follows Supreme Court precedent and 
focuses on the educational benefit interns receive. Although the pri-
mary beneficiary test has not yet allowed an intern to receive Title VII  
 
 153 One may fear that, if universities could be held liable under Title IX for facilitating intern-
ships, the universities would stop facilitating internships as a result of increased Title IX liability. 
However, concerns regarding employment outcomes coupled with the perceived necessity of an 
internship to enter many fields may just as likely incentivize universities to ensure appropriate 
safeguards are in place against harassment and discrimination before sending students to intern-
ship sites. The effect of this interpretation of Title IX liability is an empirical question outside the 
scope of this Comment. 
 154 O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1997). For an interesting discussion about 
contractual solutions to hold both universities and internship host sites accountable for incidents 
of harassment and discrimination that occur when a student is working an off-site unpaid intern-
ship as part of a degree requirement, see Bowman, supra note 30. 
 155 NAT’L ASS’N OF COLLS. & EMP’RS, supra note 12. 
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protections, it aids the analysis for relief under Title IX. When courts 
deny Title VII protections to an intern because the internship is primar-
ily educational under the primary beneficiary test, the internship is 
more likely to qualify as an education program or activity under Title 
IX.. This logic denies interns the benefits of wage and hour protections 
under the FLSA, but at least provides them with a form of legal recourse 
for gender-based harassment and discrimination. If the internship site 
does not receive federal funding, options for recourse still may exist un-
der Title IX if an intern’s school is a recipient of federal funding and 
sponsors the internship through academic credit or other means. 
